Wanda Satterthwaite Writ of Certiorari (More Details)
IN THE
United
States Supreme Court
____________________
WANDA SATTERTHWAITE et al
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY
SUPREME COURT, et al
Respondent(s).
____________________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
United States Court of Appeals Eleventh
Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Wanda
Satterthwaite c/o Marlene Santiago
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................... ii
TABLE
OF AUTHORITIES ………………………………………iii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
.............................................................
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................... 16
LIST OF PARTIES............................................................................
18
OPINIONS BELOW ..........................................................................
20
JURISDICTION ................................................................................. 22
RELEVANT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION………………………… 18
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 21
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................ 21
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......................................... 33
CONCLUSION................................................................................... 38
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND
CASES
CASES:
1.
Haines v. Kerner, 404
US at 520 (1980) ……………………………………..1
2.
Birl v. Estelle, 660
F.2d 592 (1981) ………………………………………......1
United
States v. Lee, 106 US 196,220
[1882]
……………………………….1
3.
Woodrick
v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate,
306 NJ Super 61 (App. Div. 1997) ……………………..………………….2
4.
Perez
v. Rent A Center,
892 A.2d 1255 (Sup. Ct, NJ., 2006) ………………………………...………..2
5.
Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Plymouth Gem
Industries, 1997 WL 34628991 ……………………………………..………..2
6.
Griffen
v. Griffen, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.
Ct. 556, 90 L. Ed. 635 …3,28
7.
Williamson
v. Berry, 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 1170,
1189(1850) …………………………………………..……………………...3,9
8. Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 ………………………………………………...3
9.
Old
Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907) ……………………………………………………………………………...3,37
10. Orner. V. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (Colo. 1994) …………………………6,9,10,32
11. Haun
v. Steigleder, 830 S.W.2d 833, 834 ……………….……………………37
12. Dallas
County v. Sweitzer, 971 S.W.2d 629, 630 …………………………….37
13.
Fulton v. Finch, 162
Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 ……………………...37
14.
Evans v. C. Woods, Inc., No. 12-99-00153-CV
……………………4,5,8,34
15.
Long v. Shorebank
Development Corp.,6 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999) …………………………..……………………………………….…………….33,36,38
16.
State ex rel. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486 …………………….5,11,21,34,37
17.
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 …………….…………….21
18.
National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 25 S.Ct. 70, 49
L.Ed. 184 ………………………………………………………………………………….21
19.
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59, 62 ………………….………………………21
20.
Milliken, supra, at 462 ………………..……………………………………….21
21.
Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 522 U. S. 222, 233 ………………………21
22.
King v. Taylor, 188
N.C. 450, 451, 124 S.E. 751, 751 ……………………19
23.
Ex parte Spaulding, 687
S.W.2d at 745 …………….. 4,5,11,18,21,33,34,38
24.
Ex parte Seidel, 39
S.W.3d 221, 225 ……………………………………18,19
25.
Mellon
Service Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 946 S.W.2d 862,
864 …………………………………………………………………………….24,57
26.
Merck
& Co. v. Biorganic Laboratories, Inc., ……………………………….9
27.
Watkins
v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc. 124 N.J. 398, 409 …...9
28.
Velasquez
v. Franz, 123 N.J.498, 505 (1991) ……………………………...9
29.
Stamps
v. Ford Motor Co., 650 F. Supp. 390, 404
……..………………….8
30.
Dodrill
v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 ……………………………………………..8
31.
No
East-West Highway Committee v. Chandler, 767 F.2d 21, 24 …………8
32.
Falcon
v. General Tel. Co., 815 F.2d 317, 320 .……………………………..8
33.
Pontarelli
Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 339, 340 ……..…..8
34.
Harris
Trust and Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1146 ……………………………………..…………………………………8
35.
Accord
v. U.S. Phillips Corp.,
55 F.3d at 598 ……………………………….8
36.
Estate
of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368,374
………………………………………….7,8
37.
Cadenasso
v. Bank of Italy, p. 569 …………………………………………7,8
38.
El-Kareh
v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 192, 194 …………………………………………..……………………………………4,5,6,21,34
39.
Valley
v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920) ……………………………………….……………………………………3,6
STATUTES
AND RULES:
1.
U.S. Constitution , Amend. XIV
…………………………………………….18
2.
U.S. Constitution , Amend. I
………………………………………………..18
3.
Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(b)(1) ……………………………………………………16
4.
Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)
………………………………….…………………..16
5.
Fed. R. App. Proc. 30(f) …………………………………………………….16
6.
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.,
Rule 60(b)(4) ……………………………..2,4,6,13,37
7.
28 U.S.C. §1254 (1) ………………………………………………..16
8.
28 U.S.C. §1332(a) …………………………………………………………..16
9.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 ………………………………………………………..9,14,34
1.
Does
the Full Faith and Credit Clause permit a court to vacate voided judgment that
no longer exists but previously issued by a Court, in violation of the 14th Amendment Due Process protection? A Court must declare
the judgment void because the court
may not address the merits. A Party affected by void judicial action need not appeal. A void judgment is not entitled to
the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or
declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to
it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has
no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. ... It
is not entitled to enforcement ... All proceedings founded on the void judgment
are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am. Jur. Judgments 44, 45. It does not affect, impair, or create legal rights.
If an appeal is taken, however, the appellate court may declare void
any orders the trial court signed
after it lost plenary
power over the case, because
a void judgment is a nullity from the beginning and is attended by none of the consequences of a valid judgment. And therefore, a void order cannot be
litigated.
2.
Can a court deny a Motion to Set Aside Void Orders and then sanction parties for this valid legal
request, and does such acts violate the
14th Amendment Due Process protection in relation to void judgments under Fed. R. App. Proc. §60(b)(4) which states:
“that there is
no statute of limitations on filings
in a complaint based upon fraud or fraud upon the court”? The Motion
to Set Aside was completely ignored by the court and so we present the
question.
3. Can court deny Full,
Faith and Credit to Valid Certify Order with a DNA attached? 28 U.S.C. § 1738, declares that these
materials should receive “the same full faith and credit” in each state that
they have in the state “from which they are taken.” Section 2 clause 1 reads:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.” This clause ensures equal treatment to the
citizens of all the states by the Congress.
4. Can
a Court deny a motion citing Fraud on
the Court/Concealment of Evidence
regarding personal jurisdiction without fair Due Process, without time for
discovery or evidentiary hearing of disputed facts and fraud which would
determine false
judgments that continued thereafter? This extraterritorial
operation which is demanded under article IV, § 1 of United States Constitution
and acts of Congress are impeachable for manifest fraud.
5. Can
a Court Grant a Motion predicate
on Illegitimate Ex-Post Facto, hearsay, and
speculation in 2016 as the Rule of Law
when hearsay is not permissible in court and no seal order existed for
litigation in question dated November
17, 2014? By the use of illegal
Ex Pos Facto, and hearsay, Court sanctioned parties such as Wanda for attorney
fees, and requisite judgment bond as an equitable lien on Coley’s
residential property. Doing so when no money is owed to the court. Did the
Court used criminal statutes in non-criminal case as Rule of Law? Then, subsequently, did not serve or notice
the party of judgment as required under FRAP
25(a)(2)(b)?
6. Can the court
deny a Motion to Obtain
Records on Appeal to Select Parties while giving records to others in a
manner that violates or is in direct contradiction to the 14th Amendment
Due Process protection?
Insomuch doing so by the Court then proceeded to apply sanctions on the party
for seeking the true abstract of the court records on appeal.
7.
Can an Appeal Support
a VOID JUDGMENT? When appeal is made taken from a void judgment, the Appellate Court
must declare
the judgment void, because
the appellate court may not address the merits. “This appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the
merits of an appeal from a void judgment.” Mellon Service Co. v. Touche Ross &
Co., 946 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). The also laments
justly, because jurisdiction is fundamental, an appellate court must
determine, *847 even sua sponte, whether it has
jurisdiction to consider an appeal” id.
8. Can an Appeal support
one party, a female, being subject
to laws of the state, in this case personal jurisdiction through property
ownership, and contrary to the rule of law, the other party, a male, not
subject to these same laws when he undeniably has property and thus personal
jurisdiction as well, minimum contacts? He
[Carter] has residential property in the governing state. Male party seeks to
avoid the demands of the complaint which caused damages to the female
party and all ruling thereafter were all based on the fraud upon the court
which was discriminatory in nature. Here,
the Court abandons good sense with respect to the equal protections in that,
the female and less monetarily situated person is held to a higher standard of
jurisdiction as compared to the male who is held to a lessor standard of
jurisdiction, which amounted to no personal jurisdiction being attached.
9.
Can a
Court deny an Appellant’s review of an appeal that was timely filed by appeals
clerk office with filing fees paid? See
Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a) (4) Certain
timely post-judgment motions render a notice of appeal ineffective. An amended
notice must be filed if review of the post-judgment motion’s disposition is
desired. Id.
10.
Can an
appeal support denial of records on
appeal to one party and allow a tainted record? As such, procedure described
in Fed. R. App.
Proc. 30(f) control
for hearing appeals on the original record
without requiring an accurate appendix be authorized. Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(b)(1) states in part: “The parties must not engage in unnecessary
designation of parts of the record, because the entire record is available to
the court.”
11.
Can an
Appeal support freedom of speech to
select parties such as Wanda,
when no current GAG Order in doing so, subject certain parties to
a GAG order that was not issued by the Court in claims of a high-profile case?
The bar of a high-profile case does not in itself award an automatic gag order
unless so issued by the Court. (locate proper caselaw and cite to statements)
While opposing party in which the high-profile pertains to is allowed speak
freely in public and to media and posted their response online. Allotment of
such act is disparate in manner in disparate treatment of a certain class over
another and a violation therein.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
Petitioners
asks the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that she is without counsel,
is not apt in the laws and legal procedures, and is not an attorney licensed to
practice law. Therefore, her pleadings must be read and construed liberally.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 US at 520 (1980); Birl
v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592 (1981). Further Coley believes that this court
has a responsibility and legal duty to protect any and all of Coley’s
constitutional and statutory rights. See, United
States v. Lee, 106 US 196,220
[1882]
A. The Court granted Full Faith and
Credit to a vacated/voided judgment that no longer exist of Robert Graves dated
July 16, 2010. A void judgment is a
nullity from the beginning and is attended by none of the consequences of a
valid judgment. Vacated Orders cannot be used as a final Order by any party as
a defense.
The Appellate Division erred in giving
preclusive effect to July 16, 2010, Paternity Order that was later vacated by a
Pennsylvania State Court on December 9, 2011. Moreover, the Appellate Division
ignored the April 18, 2011 disestablishment, dispositive of Robert Graves's
paternity and failed to grant Full Faith and Credit to the Pennsylvania Order
vacating the July 16, 2010 Order. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s Opinion the
issue of paternity is still in doubt in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
When
appeal is taken from a void judgment, the appellate court must declare the
judgment void, because the appellate court
may not address the merits, it must set aside the trial court's judgment
and dismiss the appeal.
In
considering the factors required for Collateral Estoppel, a Court must inquire
whether the nature and status of the prior action can be afforded preclusive
effect. A vacated judgment has no preclusive effect and therefore, collateral
estoppel does not apply. See Woodrick v. Jack J.
Burke Real Estate, 306 NJ Super
61 (App. Div. 1997); Perez v. rent A Center, 892 A.2d 1255 (Sup. Ct,
NJ., 2006); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Plymouth Gem Industries, 1997
WL 34628991 (NJ Super Law Div., 1997.
For
purposes of issue preclusion, “final judgment” includes any prior adjudication
of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect. However, a vacated judgment bears no conclusive
effect on the underlying action; therefore, it cannot be a final judgment in
other actions.
B. The Court deny a Motion to Set Aside
PA Orders void/vacated judgments denying relief under FRAP 60(b)(4). It was denied in order to cover up the fraud
on court which begun in August 2012
regarding personal jurisdiction and concealment of evidence of hiding
residential property holdings and VOID orders.
The court then sanction parties for making this valid legal
request. As Wanda Motion to Set Aside was completely ignored by
the Trial court. She signed the same complaint as the other parties. This was done in order to continue false
claims against Wanda and the complaint is still pending on the docket in New
Jersey. Not allowing for Foreign Orders
to be attacked is a denial of due process.
The
14th amendment of the United States Constitution gives everyone a right to due
process of law, which includes judgments that comply with the rules and case
law. Most due process exceptions deal with the issue of notification. If, for
example, someone gets a judgment against you in another state without your
having been notified, you can attack the judgment for lack of due process of
law. In Griffen v. Griffen, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.
Ct. 556, 90 L. Ed. 635 a pro se litigant won his case in the Supreme Court
who stated:
Williamson v. Berry, 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850).
“It has also been held that” it is not necessary to take any steps to have a
void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside, it may be impeached in any
action direct or, collateral. Holder v. Scott,
396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.). “A court cannot confer jurisdiction where
none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and
well-established law that a void order can be challenged in any court”, Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8,
27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).
The
law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal",
Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920) "Courts are constituted by
authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act
beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments
and orders are regarded as nullities;
they are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal."
Judgment
is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due
process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28
U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. The law firms and corrupted Judges went back with
illegal orders to cover up no due process and fraud upon the court which continue from 2012 to 2020.
Additionally,
a void judgment may be attacked at any time by a person whose rights are
affected. See El-Kareh v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); see also Evans
v. C. Woods, Inc., No.
12-99-00153-CV, 1999 WL 787399, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 30, 1999, no
pet. h.). Court’s Motion on Denying the Set Aside does not change the fact the
Order in question is VOID and it is entitled to no respect whatsoever
because it does not affect, impair, or create legal rights." Ex parte
Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J., concurring). If an appeal is
taken, however, the appellate court may
declare void any orders the trial court
signed after it lost plenary
power over the case, because a void judgment is a nullity from the beginning and is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid judgment.
(Code 1907, §4134; Code 1923, §7849; Code 1940, T. 7, §561.). When rule
providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not
discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner. V. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (Colo. 1994).
This cannot be ignored its fact recorded! Judgment is a void judgment if court
that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 -Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985).
When
appeal is taken from a void judgment, the appellate court must declare the
judgment void, because the appellate court may not address the merits, it
must set aside the trial court's judgment and dismiss the appeal. A void judgment may be attacked at any time
by a person whose rights are affected. See El-Kareh v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Petitioners
timely filed in the New Jersey Appellant Division regarding a Void Judgment and
No Due Process along Civil Rights issues.
In addition to this, she presented her receipts to prevent this case
complaint on a void judgment from being illegally dismissed-denied regarding a
Fraud Upon the Court and Constitutional Issues on No Due Process.
Find
here the grounds for which the Rule applies: RULE 60(b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
60(d) (1) (2) (3) and FRAP 25(a)(2)(B) and RULE 17(a)(l) and 9(b). 1994, no writ); see also Evans
v. C. Woods, Inc., No. 12-99-00153-CV, 1999 WL 787399, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Tyler Aug. 30, 1999, no pet. h.). “A Party Affected by VOID Judicial
Action Need Not APPEAL.” State ex rel. Latty, 907
S.W.2d at 486. It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not
affect, impair, or create legal rights." Ex
parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J., concurring). If an
appeal is taken, however, the appellate court may declare void any orders the
trial court signed after it lost plenary power over the case, because a void
judgment is a nullity from the beginning and is attended by none of the consequences of a valid
judgment.
Also,
Section 6-9-180: Jury trial on issues of fact. If the motion or application is
to enter satisfaction of a judgment under the New Jersey Rules of Civil
Procedure or to set aside the entry of satisfaction of a judgment, on request
of either party, the issue of fact must be tried by a jury. (Code 1886, §2870;
Code 1896, §3340; Code 1907, §4146; Code 1923, §7861; Code 1940, T. 7, §573.).
When appeal is taken from a void judgment, the appellate court must declare the
judgment void. Because the appellate court may not address the merits, it
must set aside the trial court's
judgment and dismiss the appeal in favor of appellant. A void judgment may be attacked at any time
by a person whose rights are affected. See El-Kareh v. Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
no writ); see also Evans v. C. Woods, Inc., No.12-99-00153-CV, 1999 WL
787399, at *1 (Tex. App.--Tyler Aug. 30, 1999, no pet. h.).m. The law is
well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal", Valley
v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920)
"Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power
delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in
contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities; they
are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal." Williamson
v. Berry, 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850).
When rule providing for relief from void
judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner.
V. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (Colo.
1994).
Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction
of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A..
The Court Has A Responsibility to Correct
a Void Judgment:
The
statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void
judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, p. 569;
Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368,374 [181 P. 648].) This rule holds as to
all void judgments. In the other two
cases cited, People v. Massengale and In Re Sandel, the
courts confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to
correct void judgments.
FRCP
Rule 60(b) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment
and sets forth the following six categories of reasons for which such
relief
may be granted: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an adverse party; (4) circumstances under which a judgment is
void; (5) circumstances under which a judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. F.R.C.P. Rule
60(b)(1)-(b)(6). To be entitled to relief, the moving party must establish facts within
one of the reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b). When rule providing for
relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter,
but is mandatory, Orner. V. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307
(Colo. 1994). Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.
The
Court Has A Responsibility to Correct a Void Judgment:
The
statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, p. 569; Estate of Pusey, 180
Cal. 368, 374 [181P. 648].) This rule holds as to all void judgments. In the
other two cases cited, People v.
Massengale and In Re Sandel,
the courts confirmed the judicial power
and responsibility to correct
void judgments.
Collateral
Estoppel, a Court must inquire whether the nature and status of the prior
action can be afforded preclusive effect. A vacated judgment has no preclusive
effect and therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply. Accord v. U.S. Phillips
Corp., 55 F.3d at 598; Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1146 (2d. Cir 1992)aff'd510 U.S. 86 (1993);
Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago,
929 F.2d 339, 340 (7th 1991) (en banc); Falcon v.
General Tel. Co., 815 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1987); No East-West Highway Committee v. Chandler, 767
F.2d 21, 24 (1st. Cir. 1985); Dodrill v. Ludt,
764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985); Stamps v. Ford
Motor Co., 650 F. Supp. 390, 404 (N.D.Ga. 1986). However, a vacated
judgment bears no conclusive effect on the underlying action; therefore, it
cannot be a final judgment in other actions.
C. Not given Full Faith and Credit for
sister state PA Order dated April 18, 2011 and December 9, 2011, other
parties were given full faith and credit for two other sister state PA Orders
which no longer had legal value as these orders no longer have legal value
because they depended upon an Order that was VACATED. 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
declares that these materials should receive “the same full faith and credit”
in each state that they have in the state “from which they are taken.” By not
granting Full, faith and Credit allowed fiction over facts to litigate the case
allowing more Fraud Upon the court and denying parties of their Human Rights
under the 14th Amendment. RYMIR' paternity which has not been adjudicated. Vacated
Orders cannot be used as a final Order by any party as a defense. “The term
'res judicata' refers broadly to the. . . doctrine barring relitigation of
claims or issues that have already been adjudicated." Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J.498, 505 (1991). Specifically,
the doctrine "provides that a cause of action between parties that has
been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot
be relitigated by those parties. . . in a new proceeding." Id. Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991).
D. Concealment of evidence – Court
allowed fraudulently misrepresentation
in the very first litigation August 13, 2012 pertaining to
and about his property holdings and contacts with the forum state to avoid
personal jurisdiction. The Appellant Division made Coley submit to residency
laws in regard to personal jurisdiction, due to property ownership, but South
Carolina did not despite having New Jersey properties. This is gender
discrimination and South Carolina's part by false actions causing denials with fraud
on the court thereafter. In Merck & Co. v.
Biorganic Laboratories, Inc., the Appellate Division stated defendants
who engaged in a "deliberate course of conduct" that
"frustrate[d] plaintiff's discovery of facts” should not be award sanction
for attorney fees.
As
stated the law firms and corrupted Judges went back with illegal orders to
cover up no due process and fraud upon the court with continuous violations
of a denial of Due Process, with the intent to cover the illegal rulings
thereafter. In Hopes no one would find out the truth on what really occurred
here. There was Fraud on the Court on August 13, 2012 (FD-04-2874-12) to 2019- and
thereafter the judges and court knew this.
With more litigation also came more fraud upon the Court,
without lack of standing on a Void Judgment, petitioner believes is illegal
which the Court sought to enforce a VOID order that had NO legally standing
whatsoever. Avoiding the No Due Process of discovery and fact finding is
unlawful and alienates the Petitioner from the due process sought. After the
crime was committed based upon premise
of Fraud Upon the Court which begun in 2012 regarding false statements
of property ownership then it continues, and the fraud increased in July 2015
with denial of Motion to Set Aside Void orders see above. Along with a host of other acts of Fraud Upon
the Court see below. Constitutional and Civil Laws were violated here, that was
covered up illegally with illegal orders based upon fraud and fraud upon the
courts. A void judgment procured
by fraud, can be attacked at any time,
in any court, either directly or collaterally and should be vacated along with
all proceeding order under that docket number FD-04-2874-14 and related.
Again,
under Federal laws, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. “They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar
to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They
constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such
judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.” A party
affected by void judicial action need not appeal. State ex rei. Latty,
907 S.W.2d at 486. It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not
affect, impair, or create legal rights." Ex parte Spaulding, 687
S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J., concurring). When appeal is taken from a void
judgment, the appellate court must declare the judgment void. Because the
appellate court may not address the merits, it must set aside
the trial court's judgment and
dismiss the appeal.
E. A Court cannot grant a motion based
on hearsay and speculation as the Rule of Law, since hearsay is
inadmissible not permitted in court. The Court subsequently used that illegal
hearsay to provide cover for sanctioning parties for attorney fees, filings of
a Judgment Bond as equitable liens on Petitioner’s residential property as
no money was owed to the court by Petitioner. In addition, the Court used
criminal statutes for non-criminal case as controlling rule of law. And lastly,
the Court never served the party under FRAP 25(a)(2)(b) making this Judgment
unlawful as notice must be given and due process was abridged.
In
Rule 4.4 Service of process:
If any of the parties set out in Section 4-4, whose names are known,
reside in the State of New Jersey, a copy of the order must be served
upon them, in the same manner
that process is served on defendants in civil actions. (Acts 1923, No. 526, p.
699; Code 1923, §9914; Code 1940, T. 7, §1118; Acts 1951, No.882, p. 1521, §3.)
F. Some Parties were were
denied Court audio and documents on appeal which obstructing their ability to
defend their appeal. A
high-profile male performer was able to obtain documents; see, Rule 1:4-4
Records on Appeal, and Rule 5:3-2(b). This was discriminatory and as such, those,
not being a high-profile, female was denied Due Process. Also see, In A-1916-16
Wanda; Wanda was denied freedom of speech, and court services when
seeking to fix court errors. Appellant cites 18 USC § 1512 and 18 USC § 1341
for concealment of records in official proceedings, evading the legal process
by withholding court records required to defend the case, and retaliation in
relation to the Motion to Reconstruct Audio when Appellant was denied Certified
Audio from Court and physical records while other male party was given these
same records. The Court also cannot sanction party for seeking the truth in
asking for records on appeal as right.
Other
Acts of Allege Fraud on Court the Came About Due to Initial Fraud
On August 13, 2012 to 2020 to Hide ALL
litigation thereafter 2012 the Judges and Court knew to Avoid Due Process of
Discovery of Facts, such allegations include: Bribery when Judge asked
party on record for money, Denied Court Records on Appeal, Court Audios Altered
leading to Tainted Record, Altered Court Orders, Denied the Right to Appeal and
Illegal equitable Bonds filed as lien on party’s property when no money is due
to the court for illegal attorney fees sanctions that was never served on
party, denied freedom of speech, etc.
See History for more details.
List of Parties
All Parties appeal in the
caption of the case on the cover page.
Rymir Satterhwaite
Wanda Satterthwaite
Lillie M. Coley, PhD
Vs.
NEW JERSEY Supreme Court
NEW JERSEY Appellant
Division
NEW JERSEY Family Court
NEW JERSEY Civil Court
Robert G.
OPINIONS BELOW
A-1817-14
A-1185-14 –
Appeals Opinion Illegally Combined: A-099-15, A-227-15, A-228-14, A-229-15(Civil
Law), A-1916-16 & A-2491-16(Civil
Law) - See Appendix
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction on a void judgments,
fraudulent orders, and constitutional issues.
28 U.S.C. §1254 (1).
There is diversity of citizenship between the parties
and the amount in controversy
exceeds the sum of $100,000.
The district court had jurisdiction
in cases and controversy under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a).
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. The 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution gives everyone
a right to due process of law, which includes judgments
that comply with the rules and case law. Most due process, exceptions deal with the issue of notification.
If. for example, someone
gets a judgment against you in another state without your having been notified,
you can attack the judgment
for lack of due process of
law. In Griffen v. Griffen, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S. Ct. 556, 90 L. Ed. 635 pro se litigant
won his case in the Supreme Court. A void judgment is a nullity from
the beginning and is attended by none of the consequences of a valid judgment.
It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not affect, impair, or
create legal rights." Ex parte Seidel, 39
S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), Ex parte
Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J., concurring).
Finally,
“A writ of certiorari is a discretionary, extraordinary writ—and is therefore
never granted as a matter of right.” See, e.g., King v. Taylor, 188 N.C. 450, 451, 124 S.E. 751, 751
(1924) (explaining that the writ “is allowed only on a reasonable show of
merits and that the ends of justice will be thereby promoted”). Petitioner
relies on the merits and duties of the father to provide for the family,
barring that, for the Court to step in and provide a fair legal means to
adjudicate his absence.
Full, Faith and Credit
Well settled caselaw
declares that these materials should receive “the same full faith and credit”
in each state that they have in the state “from which they are taken.” Ex
parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Noting the United
States Supreme Court has ruled on this issue in 577 U. S. ____ (2016), (US
Supreme Court granting), stated, “with respect to judgments, “the full faith
and credit obligation is exacting.”” Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 522 U. S. 222, 233 (1998). “A final judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject
matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition
throughout the land.” Ibid. “Consequently, before a court is bound by
[a] judgment rendered in another State, it may inquire into the jurisdictional
basis of the foreign court’s decree.” Ibid. That jurisdictional inquiry,
however, is a limited one. “[I]f the judgment on its face appears to be a
‘record of a court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over the cause
and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by
the record itself.’” Milliken, supra, at 462 (quoting
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59, 62 (1938)).
Here in this case, the Court rendered no hearing and placed no weight on the
Judgment, instead focusing on other matters that in hindsight should not have
been heard in light of the sister states prior Judgment or until such time as
the question of law is settled. Justice Holmes lamented in his decision, “The
Georgia judgment appears on its face to have been issued by a court with
jurisdiction, and there is no established Georgia law to the contrary.” Id.
Civil
Rights Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1983
42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et sec,
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, when parties were
denied due process subjected to gender discrimination, retaliation, disability,
and race. A civil right is an enforceable right or privilege, which if interfered
with by another gives rise to an action for injury. Discrimination occurs when
the civil rights of an individual are denied or interfered with because of the
individual's membership in a particular group or class. Various jurisdictions
have enacted statutes to prevent discrimination based on a person's race, sex,
religion, age, previous condition of servitude, physical limitation, national
origin, political affiliation and in some instance’s sexual orientation.
Freedom
of Speech
The
First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression from
government interference. It prohibits any laws that establish a
national religion, impede the free exercise of religion,
abridge the freedom of speech, infringe upon the freedom of the
press, interfere with the right to peaceably assemble, or
prohibit citizens from petitioning for a governmental redress of
grievances.
INTRODUCTION
The case before the Court involves a void
judgment which is well-settled caselaw that “a void judgment may be
attacked at any time by a person whose rights are affected.” See El-Kareh v.
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.]. A judgment obtained in violation of procedural due process is not
entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon in another jurisdiction. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S.
257, 25 S.Ct. 70, 49 L.Ed. 184; Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 23, 27 S.Ct. 236, 241, 51 L.Ed. 345; Baker
v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 401, 37 S.Ct. 152,
154, 61 L.Ed. 386. Moreover, due process requires that no other jurisdiction
shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired
without due process. Restatement of Judgments, § 11, Comment (c). See 328 U.S. 876, 66 S.Ct. 975 (Rehearing Denied
April 29, 1946). A Party Affected by VOID Judicial Action Need Not APPEAL. State ex rel. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486. It is
entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not affect, impair, or create
legal rights." Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J.,
concurring).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
- Factual
background
The
Appellate Division erred in giving preclusive effect to July 16, 2010,
Paternity Order that was later vacated by a Pennsylvania State Court on
December 9, 2011. Moreover, the Appellate Division ignored the April 18, 2011
disestablishment, dispositive of Robert Graves's paternity and failed to grant
Full Faith and Credit to the Pennsylvania Order vacating the July 16, 2010
Order. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s Opinion the issue of paternity is
still in doubt in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
When appeal
is taken from a void judgment, the appellate court must declare the judgment void, because the
appellate court may not address the
merits, it must set aside the trial court's judgment and dismiss the
appeal.
- Procedural
History
The Court
granted Full Faith and Credit to a vacated/voided judgment that no longer exist
of Robert Graves dated July 16, 2010. A void judgment is a nullity
from the beginning
and is attended by none of the consequences of a valid judgment. Vacated
Orders cannot be used as a final Order by any party as a defense.
The
Appellate Division erred in giving preclusive effect to July 16, 2010,
Paternity Order that was later vacated by a Pennsylvania State Court on
December 9, 2011. Moreover, the Appellate Division ignored the April 18, 2011
disestablishment, dispositive of Robert Graves's paternity and failed to grant
Full Faith and Credit to the Pennsylvania Order vacating the July 16, 2010
Order. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s Opinion the issue of paternity is
still in doubt in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey. When appeal is taken from a void judgment, the appellate court
must declare
the judgment void, because
the appellate court may not address the merits, it must set aside the trial court's judgment
and dismiss the appeal.
- Statement of Case
This
case arises out of two jurisdictions in New Jersey and it begun in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Case of Wanda
Satterthwaite vs Shawn Carter (a.k.a. Jay Z).
Beginning
on April 18, 2011 not to exclude prior pleadings, Graves is Disestablished,
Support Order Vacated and dispositive per Pennsylvania Court Order on paternity
of Rymir.
On
May 2011 Attorney Ned Hark illegally uses his sister-in-law a Family Court Supervisor
in Philadelphia to help get the May 19, 2011 [of] Pennsylvania “Res Judicata
Advisory Order” entered in by Judge Peckhrow by sending her fraudulent
information about Graves which caused the PA Court to make an error. Wanda
became sick and never appealed and Petitioners was not a part of any
Pennsylvania actions at this time and unaware of this Pennsylvania Advisory
Order. [Recusal of supervisor should have been made in light of relations.]
In
New Jersey on June 14, 2011 Coley becomes Rymir’s legal guardian per a NJ per
court order. New Jersey then becomes controlling state under Federal Law.
In Pennsylvania on December 9, 2011 Graves
paternity Order of July 16, 2010 was Vacated by Coley in PA; Graves is forever
gone, as if he never existed as Rymir’s father;
Coley
attempts to Vacate SHAWN CARTER’s May 19, 2011 Advisory PA Order that depended
upon Graves which no longer existed as of December 9, 2011 as stated above
which was New Information. However, Coley was colluded on by her then attorney
James Rocco and Defense Attorney for CARTER, Ned Hark ultimately Coley was MOOT
in PA based on Fraud and has no legal standing.
In
New Jersey on August 2012 Coley uses Judge Doris Peckrow, in Pennsylvania on June 14, 2012 Order of
Relinquished Jurisdiction to pursue paternity matters in New Jersey. Attorney Ned
Hark sends his wife Attorney Fisher to New Jersey to defend SHAWN CARTER’s case
by stalling for time while Hark appeal’s in-part the PA Order of Judge Peckhrow
regarding the vacate of orders. CARTER does NOT appeal the Relinquished
Jurisdiction. Fisher and CARTER allegedly lied on Record stating CARTER does
not have any contacts with the State of New Jersey regarding properties but he
in fact has properties.
In
New Jersey 2012 Attorney Lise Fisher's actions involving both FD-04-002874-12, Lillie
Coley v. SHAWN CARTER & Wanda Satterthwaite and FD-04-00186-14, Rymir
Satterthwaite v. SHAWN CARTER &
Wanda Satterthwaite violated several Codes/ Rules of Professional Conduct
as described below. An attorney should uphold the highest standards of conduct
in the court and in their legal practice. However, Fisher did not uphold these
standards and the court allowed it.
Fisher
and CARTER continuously made false statements on record and in her filings.
These lies prohibited the discovery of facts, an evidentiary hearing and caused
continuous violations to occur.
Fisher
gave false statements about her client, CARTER’s, minimum contacts with the
State of New Jersey on at least two cases: NEW JERSEY # FD-04-002874-12 &
FD-04-0000186-14 and over numerous litigation such as hearings August 13, 2012,
December 12, 2012, and November 17, 2014. However, these false statements
continued until now(2019). The record has never been corrected.
Robert
Graves’s paternity was disestablished, support order vacated and dispositive on
paternity of Rymir in PA on April 18, 2011. His name was removed from birth
certificate in May 2011. New Jersey had exclusive and continuous jurisdiction
of Rymir effective June 14, 2011, while he was still a minor, and NEW JERSEY
then became the controlling State. Fisher made false statements regarding the
subject jurisdiction at the August 13, 2012 hearing. Fisher stated that a child
support order was still in effect in Philadelphia during this time and placed a
closed/false child support number on her application and then gave that false
information to Coley’s attorney and the NEW JERSEY court that relied upon it.
However, thel previous child support order was voided when Graves’ was
disestablishment and dispositive on paternity in April 18, 2011 PA Order which
Fisher was fully aware of.
On
June 14, 2012, Pennsylvania courts relinquished jurisdiction over this matter
and this relinquished was never disputed or reverse. Therefore, no conflicts
preclude New Jersey Courts to have jurisdiction. Not only does CARTER reside in
New Jersey, but due to maintaining his properties and business CARTER assumed
contacts with New Jersey. The Orders in June 14, 2012 depended upon Graves and
have no legal value thus cannot be used a legal defense by anyone.
Fisher
gave false information about both the Subject and Personal Jurisdiction to the
Court. CARTER owned at least 3 residential properties in New Jersey and was a
resident. CARTER was even served at one of his New Jersey properties. At the
August 13, 2012, October 17, 2012 and December 14, 2012 hearings Fisher
continued to lie about CARTER owning property in New Jersey even after seeing
the Certified Deeds. Fisher kept these false statements going for years in
order to prohibit the Court’s establishment of personal jurisdiction over CARTER
Attorney
Fisher made Discriminatory [remarks] towards Wanda Satterthwaite on August 13,
2012 stating she did not want Wanda sitting next to her. Although it was clear
Wanda was defendant in the case also, but Fisher believe she had authority in
government facility. Judge Mc Bride told her “to knock it off”.
Attorney
Fisher made false statements to Judge McBride at the August 13, 2012 hearing
regarding the personal jurisdiction of CARTER She later said she misspoke at
the December 14, 2012 hearing with Judge Mc Bride which was not true because
she knew truth before court hearing based on Coley’s application, and she
continued to repeat the false information at every [step of] litigation.
Support
Orders under the UFISA Act require subject jurisdiction only and paternity
under this act require personal jurisdiction only. Only personal jurisdiction
is necessary in New Jersey to request paternity testing of CARTER since he owns
properties in New Jersey and the Support Order after the testing would be
guided under the New Jersey laws since Rymir lived in New Jersey. A person can
request paternity while never seeking support and New Jersey absolutely had
personal jurisdiction over CARTER, therefore genetic testing could have been
ordered by the Court had they been able to establish jurisdiction.
Coley
should have received her request for paternity and discovery in 2012 due to SHAWN
CARTER's property ownership. Judge McBride agreed, stating on August 13, 2012,
"So the issue then is whether
there are enough contacts here for there to be general personal jurisdiction
meaning the contacts are unrelated to what the subject matter of the lawsuit
is. But if the contacts are sufficient enough, under the law and under the
Constitution, it can be a case; it just depends on the facts, where a SHAWN
CARTER can be required to answer in court to something that is unrelated to
those contacts. And I think that's what we have here." August 13, 2012
Transcript Page 37 lines 6-13.
Coley
and the New Jersey Court did rely on Fisher's false statements regarding SHAWN
CARTER’s New Jersey properties. Again, the New Jersey Court relied upon false
statements regarding subject matter when Fisher stated that a Pennsylvania
Support Order of Graves was still active in Philadelphia which was false. She
also placed this closed Graves’ Support Order on her application and gave it to
Coley’s attorney who relied upon and placed it on his documents for Coley. “Be
advised that Coley filed her initial application Pro Se then she
obtained counsel and Coley did not have any information about Graves Closed
Support Order on her application. On August 13, 2012 a ruling on subject and
personal jurisdiction was made based on these false statements of Fisher. Coley
at the minimum should have obtained personal jurisdiction and discovery due to CARTER’s
New Jersey properties. This ruling prohibited the "evidentiary hearing to
take place" as described by Judge McBride.
The
May 15, 2012 Pennsylvania transcript shows the concealment of evidence by
Attorney Fisher to the New Jersey Courts of the false statements made on record
regarding Wanda requesting genetic testing from CARTER on April 27, 2012 in
Pennsylvania and her knowledge that Coley had no legal standing at this
hearing. [See] Pennsylvania hearing on May 15, 2012. Fisher conceal this
information from New Jersey Courts from August 2012 to present.
Coley
was unaware that she no longer had legal standing on Pennsylvania, [insomuch
on] May 15, 2012 until fall of 2015, but Fisher was aware. Fisher concealed
evidence of the Pennsylvania transcript and made statements on court records to
the contrary of the transcript knowing the statements made were false.
Statements made were such as: Coley having legal standing; and Mother
requesting a genetic testing on April 27, 2012. Under New Jersey law, concealment
of evidence and disrupting a plaintiff's civil action gives rise to liability
for proximately caused damages. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Allen Canning, 321
New Jersey Super. 178 (App. Div. 199Ql; Fox v. Mercedes Benz, 281 New
Jersey Super 476 (App. Div. 1999). New Jersey law in N.J.S.A. 2C:21-3.
Even
during the 2012 Pennsylvania action Rymir was able to exercise the laws of
paternity in New Jersey, but Fisher and her husband Attorney Ned Hark sought to
try and keep the paternity matter in Philadelphia to hinder Rymir’s rights in
New Jersey.
In
2013 at Rymir’s Inheritance Act litigation Fisher now join with Attorney
Kenneth L. Winers again gave false statements about Rymir’s paternity was still
in PA and had been adjudicated to Judge Nan Famular. Fisher “Objected”
and told the Court after Rymir stated Graves was no longer in the picture that,
she stated “Rymir Don’t have any firsthand knowledge about this”, but
Fisher had firsthand knowledge. Fisher again concealed another PA Order and in
this case the Order of Graves being Vacated on December 9, 2011 demonstrating
that Graves was “forever gone” from the PA system as Rymir’s father.
Coley’s
November 17, 2014 Request for Hearing was due to this fraud, perjury, and
mischaracterization of the documents and omitted attachments given to the
Camden Court on August 13, 2012 and December 14, 2012 by Fisher as stated
above. Fisher gave false statements in the 2015 brief to the Appellant Court
such as stating that Judge Peckhrow vacated the Orders of June 14, 2012 but denied
genetic. (PA May 15, 2012 Transcript Page 24 Lines 18-19;) demonstrates the
truth of what the Judge Peckhrow stated that Mother did not request a genetic
test. Judge Polanksy relied upon Fisher’s false statements and stated that
mother had made a request for genetic testing and therefore could not request
again. Therefore, the continuous lies of Fisher caused multiple violations
against Coley and Rymir and prevented them from receiving a fair litigation.
Judge Polansky also believed that Graves became Rymir’s father again based
on PA opinion in 2013, but this also was false and caused by Fisher.
Also,
at November 17, 2014, before Judge Stephen Polansky, Fisher made additional
false statements regarding Rymir’s paternity. Fisher stated that Rymir requested
genetic testing of SHAWN CARTER 2011 which is also false, so that it would
appear Rymir was barred from requesting any relief in 2013 in New Jersey.
In
December 2014, Coley became aware of Fisher filing one version of documents
with the courts on November 17, 2014, but serving her with a different version,
and requested discovery from Judge Polansky. Fisher stated Judge Dortch was “in
her pocket” since SHAWN CARTER was rich client. This is improper conduct of an
attorney. Also, per her inappropriate conduct, at the July 17, 2015 hearing see
below, Fisher also made multiple offensive and insulting comments to Coley and
Rymir to the extent that the court’s Clerk intervened in order for Fisher to
discontinue the conduct.
On
May 2016 Coley did not make any statements to, conduct any interviews with, or
release any information to the media. Therefore, there is no evidence that she
has [defied sealed order or the others of the same]. However, Fisher filed a
Litigants Aid II Motion against Coley. In response, Coley filed a motion
regarding CARTER’s frivolous claims. Coley requested an evidentiary hearing
regarding the Litigants Aid II motion, which was granted. In response to the
granting of the evidentiary hearing from Coley’s request Fisher withdrew the
motion on July 21, 2016. So, there is no Order for this frivolous filing which
wasted Coley’s time and money.
On
May 1, 2015 the Litigant Aid I Relief filed by Fisher was unfounded and
erroneous. This motion named Coley and Rymir although Rymir was not even party
to the case. There is no proof in record or otherwise that actions of Coley
lead to damages to CARTER since no records left the court. The Civil Law Court
refused to seal the record per an emergent request from Fisher, and they also
would not sanction Coley, because no violation occurred. So, Fisher then
requested sanctions of attorney fees from the Family Court against Coley and
received it from Judge Dortch, without any evidence other than statements made
by Fisher, and a newspaper article. However, in 2012 Fisher had given the
documents of concern to Coley’s attorney, and they became part of the public
docket in Philadelphia. In addition, in 2013 a NEW JERSEY Civil Law Court
Supervisor released the same documents to the public by way of giving them to
an interested Rutgers University student. Attorney Leish, for the Daily News
stated that the documents used by the National Enquirer were available and accessed
from the online Philadelphia docket. (July 17, 2015 Transcript Page 38 lines
6-11 & Transcript Page 57 lines 24-25). And Fisher admits that the
information was obtained from the docket website yet filed the following
multiple motions for sanctions. (July 17, 2015 Transcript Page 42 lines 5-10)
On
May 13, 2016 litigation changing the May 1, 2015 Order to a Judgment for
illegal attorney fees. Fisher’s Motions demonstrate that Rymir was not a party
to the action resulting in the May 1, 2015 Sanctions Order. Fisher submitted
false documents to the court on May 13, 2016 under this docket no.
FD-04-000186-14 asking court to join these cases which was illegal since this
FD-14 docket had no underlying case.
Concluding
May 28, 2016 & June 28, 2016 Fisher files a Motion to Show Cause
which was delayed by the court for several weeks. The Motion was about a two(2)
minute video Wanda did to support her son Rymir. All parties were required to
respond which was waste of time and money since no Gag Order existed prohibiting
anyone from talking about the case as was in the public since 2010. Coley and
Rymir were not a part of Wanda’s video. However, Fisher essentially filed
another frivolous Motion for money stating Wanda’s Video violated Judge Mc
Bride Seal Order on August 13, 2012 at which it does not. After Wanda
attorney’s argument on June 28, 2016 in this regard Judge Dortch created a new
Order on June 28, 2016 saying no files to public and parties cannot talk about
instant. However, the language in the Order was ambiguous and unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, Judge Dortch still illegally sanction Wanda for attorney fees
since Fisher kept begging him as she wanted to get paid. But, more importantly
the new order dated June 28, 2016 proves that Judge Mc Bride Seal Order had no
restrictions on parties regarding neither files nor free speech which is why a
new one was created by Judge Dortch. This June 28, 2016 Order is on appeal
since its unconstitutional and has ambiguous language. The Appellant Division
already stated in July 2015 per court order that parties were NOT prohibited to
Freedom of Speech since “these cases were already discussed, and files have
been disseminated in public”. So, as stated Wanda did not violate any order
and Fisher knew her filing was inappropriate.
In
December 2016 - Fisher filed yet another Litigants Aid III Motion. After
many months of requesting transcript audio of the November 17, 2014 hearing, it
was finally received by Wanda. The CD was sent to Mr. Patel, an expert, for
review. Patel also owns a UPS store in NEW JERSEY. Patel did not listen to the
audio on the CD, he used his software to review the file. Fisher stated in this
Litigants Aid III Motion that Patel “published” his analysis and information
from the CD. However, Patel sent his analysis of the file directly to the
court. He did not send his analysis directly to any parties. And again, Fisher
named Rymir in this Motion although he was not involved with case after the CD
was sent blank. Coley filed a Response to this Motion, however Fisher
erroneously stated that they did not receive the Response. However, the filing
was confirmed by the court clerk, and Coley has mail receipts of her service to
Fisher.
In
January 2017 - Amidst filing the multiple Litigants’ Aid Motions, Fisher
advised CARTER to speak with the media. CARTER responded to the media that he
“did not rape Wanda,” and that their sexual intercourse in 1992 was
“consensual”. However, the other parties did not engage with the media, and
Fisher filed multiple Litigants Aid Motions against them.
In
June 2017 - An issue listed in the Litigants Aid III Motion regarded embedded
links that allegedly lead to the August 13, 2012 hearing transcript on Rymir’s
professional Facebook page. However, Fisher stated in court that she did not
know where the links came from. And again, Rymir was not a party to this action
regarding the transcript. No fact finding, discovery or evidence was ever
provided for any of these Motions. This Motion, like the rest, was frivolous
and filed to abuse the other parties.
Fisher
continuously failed to conduct herself to the standards of Rules of
Professional Conduct. Fisher made multiple and continuous false statements in
order to obstruct justice, deny the other parties right to due process,
intimidate the other parties and prohibit Rymir's right to learn his paternity.
As stated Attorney Fisher also made Discriminatory towards Wanda Satterthwaite
on August 13, 2012. Her conduct in these matters were unprofessional and some
cases inhumane.
Around
December or Fall 2018 Attorney Fisher and other attorneys Altered
Documents and New Jersey Court Orders located in their client’s, CARTER’s
Appendix in Response to Appeal A-229-15 see below. This behavior was allowed by the Appellant
Division Judges in their Fall 2019 opinion.
The Courts are faced with the type of improper conduct by litigants and
lawyers that tarnishes the justice system and makes for a dark day for all
involved: the apparent forgery of documents presented to the Court. Previously
on appeal, CARTER, the Respondent in Rymir Satterthwaite vs SHAWN CARTER &
Wanda Satterthwaite, has added to Volume 2 of his Rymir Brief Appendix three
official documents which formed the lower court record, and which now have
information “whited out.” Respondent’s Appendix Volume 2 contains
substantially-altered materials which contradict the Official Transcript and
Official Court Orders in three specific instances – Transcript of a Motion
Hearing, Order to Close the Courtroom and Seal the Record, and Order Setting
Aside Pennsylvania Orders. In summation, three (3) critical documents which
have been entered into the record by the Respondent are altered versions of
the original documents filed with the Superior Court. Such conduct warrants the
harshest of penalties, including striking the altered submissions from the
Court’s record and imposing sanctions on the Respondent’s and his attorneys.
However, none of this occur which allowed attorneys to continue.
REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT
“Avoid judgment is a nullity from the beginning and is
attended by none of the consequences of a valid judgment. It is entitled to no
respect whatsoever because it does not affect, impair, or create legal rights.”
Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J., concurring). A court
cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding
valid. A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a
void proceeding valid. A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a
court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks
inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any
court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly
before the court. See Long v. Shorebank Development
Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7
Ill. 1999). “A void judgment is a nullity from the beginning and is
attended by none of the consequences of
a valid judgment. It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not
affect, impair, or create legal rights.” Under Federal law, which is
applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is
"without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities.
They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought,
even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no
justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or
sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers. A Party Affected by VOID
Judicial Action Need Not APPEAL. State ex rei. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486.
It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not affect, impair, or
create legal rights." Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J.,
concurring).
When rule providing for relief from void judgments is
applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner. V.
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (Colo. 1994). When appeal is taken from a void judgment, the appellate
court must declare the judgment void,
because the appellate court may not address the merits, it must set aside the
trial court's judgment and dismiss the appeal.
A void judgment may be attacked at any time by a person whose rights are
affected. See El-Kareh v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d
192, 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); see also Evans v. C. Woods, Inc., No. 12-99-00153-CV, 1999 WL
787399, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 30, 1999, no pet. h.). 28 U.S.C. §
1738, declares that these materials should receive “the same full faith and
credit” in each state that they have in the state “from which they are taken.”
This legal right was not for sister state Pennsylvania Order dated April 18,
2011 and December 9, 2011, which were valid Orders. Another party was given full faith and credit
for two different sister state Pennsylvania Orders which no longer had legal
value as these depended upon the Order in question that was VACATED on December
9, 2011.
Concealment of evidence caused Fraud Upon the
Court on the offset when party did not have to submit to
the State of New Jersey via personal jurisdiction which could have brought
about a paternity closure. This
concealment caused damages for parties and all litigations thereafter
was built upon this one act of fraud and party continue to give court false
information regarding its residential holdings in the state of New Jersey. Coley continually requested a Discovery which
was Denied, and she also provided the court with New Jersey Deed’s
demonstrating CARTER’s residents and the disputed facts, and in turn she was
denied due process and inability to perform discovery of facts and reach
adjudication on the merits.
Some fraud led to illegal equitable Bonds illegally
recorded as lien on Coley’s residential properties at which she was never
served to recording under. There was no due process, process of service from
Court, Coley found out from seeing a document filed by parties on appeal. A court
cannot enter order based on hearsay then use this hearsay orders to file a
judgment Bond as equitable liens on persons residential property when no money
is owed to the court. In view of this Court should invalidate the judgment.
Additionally, the Court used criminal statutes for non-criminal case as rule of
law, which is abusive in its power, then, this Judgment enter was never served on Coley under FRAP
25(a)(2)(b) regarding her residential property. Coley became aware of this
allege transaction in reviewing documents from adversary appendix on appeal. A
void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks
jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to
enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked
at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the
party is properly before the court. See Long v. Shorebank Development Corp.,
182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999, FRCP RULE 60(b), FRCP Rule 60(b) provides that:
the court may relieve a party from a final judgment and sets forth the
following six categories of reasons for
which such relief may be granted: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59; (3)
fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an adverse party; (4) circumstances
under which a judgment is void; (5) circumstances under which a judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. F.R.C.P. Rule
60(b)(1)-(b)(6). To be entitled to
relief, the moving party must establish
facts within one of the reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b).
As stated, The Appellant Division did not give Coley.
full, faith and credit for the PA Orders dated April 18, 2011, and December 9,
2011 regarding RYMIR' paternity which has not been adjudicated. CARTER did get
credit for PA Orders of May 19, 2011, and July 16, 2010, which both depend upon
the PA Order that no longer exist because it has been vacated. Vacated Orders
cannot be used as a final Order and CARTER cannot use a vacated Order as a
defense. A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot
make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well-established law that a
void order can be challenged in any court", Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v.
McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907). Citing from Ins. Co. of
State of Pennsylvania v. Martinez, 18 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App. 2000). “This appellate court has no jurisdiction to
consider the merits of an appeal from a void judgment.” Mellon Service Co.
v. Touche Ross & Co., 946 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, no writ). “A judgment is void only when it is clear that the court
rendering judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no
jurisdiction to render judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.” State ex
rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.1995). “When appeal is taken
from a void judgment, the appellate court must declare the judgment void” Id.
at 486 (citing Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346
S.W.2d 823, 827 (1961)); Dallas County v.
Sweitzer, 971 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no writ); Haun v. Steigleder, 830 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.App.-San
Antonio 1992, no writ).
CONCLUSION
It has
often been said a fact is a fact is a fact, and insomuch these are the facts,
and they are not avoidable. Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered
judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted
in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule
60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 -Klugh v. U.S., 620
F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C.1985). When appeal is taken from a void judgment, the
appellate court must declare the
judgment void, because the appellate
court may not address the merits, it must set aside the trial court's
judgment and dismiss the appeal. A void
judgment may be attacked at any time by a person whose rights are affected.
First, A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a
void proceeding valid. A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a
court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks
inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or
collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court. See Long
v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999). Secondly,
conferring no created legal rights to a would provide for hearing, “It is
entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not affect, impair, or create
legal rights.” Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d at 745 (Teague, J.,
concurring). Additionally, A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none
existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. A void judgment which includes
judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an
order procured by fraud, can be
attacked at any time, in any court,
either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the
court. See Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7
Ill. 1999). And Finally, the equitable bonds illegally recorded by Court Order,
must have lien recorded. There was never a recorded lien or any conveyance to
Lillie Coley concerning her residential properties by the Court who created the
Judgment, and by doing so never gave notice or due process to Petitioner. Also,
Court lacking standing to rule is void judgment upon which void is nullity in
the eyes of the law. However, it is in contravention of the Governed Laws and
Security Laws under Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of
1933 and Section 21C of the Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 13(a),
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1,
13a-11, 13a-13-using deceptive practices and more. Furthermore, Section
35-4-50: Conveyances required to be recorded in office of probate judge:
Conveyances of property, required by law to be recorded, must be recorded in
the office of the judge of probate. (Code 1852, §1268; Code 1867, §1537; Code
1876, §2147; Code 1886, §1791; Code 1896, §985; Code 1907, §3367; Code 1923,
§6853; Code 1940, T. 47, §94.).
The
petitioner hereby asks this Honorable Court to award the relief requested in
this Petition for Writ of Certiorari and all other legal and equitable relief
as this Court may deem necessary.
Marlene
Santiago for
Wanda's aunt hit it nail on. Thanks for posting Wanda's story.
ReplyDelete